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OF THE
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NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for damages for the defendant's
alleged tortious interference with the business relations of
tlic plaintiffs arising out of defendant's actions in termi,,~ing

a financing arrangement with the plaintiff Globe;

sending a notice of assignment of leases to the lessees of
the plaintiff Globe; and dishonoring three checks drawn by
Globe on its account with defendant.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the court.

From a judgment

for the plaintiff Globe Leasing and a dismissal of defendant's
counterclaims, defendant appeals.

The court below found no

cause of action for plaintiffs Alfred B. Weigelt and Gloria
Morrison Weigelt and dismissed all claims against individual
defendant, Norton Parker.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks a reversal of the judgment and
Judgment in its favor as a matter of law on the question of
its liability, or that failing, a new trial on the question
of liability.

Alternatively, defendant seeks reversal of

Lhe award of damages to plaintiff and the denial of any
awctrd of damages to plaintiff as a matter of law, or that
'-·

1

iling,
·: ; 1

t

0.

1 ''"

new trial on the issue of damages.

Finally, and

to the foregoing, defendant seeks the reversal
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of the judgment of dismissal on its counterclaims and judgment in its favor with an appropriate award of damages on
those counterclaims which are addressed in argument hereafter, as a matter of law, or that failing, a new trial on
the counterclaims of the defendant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The actions of Appellant, Commercial Security Bank
of Salt Lake (the Bank) complained of by Appellee, Globe
Leasing Corporation (Globe) occurred in and around July of
1974.

(Tr Vol. 1 at 47-59)

Specifically, on or about

July 15, 1974, the Bank mailed letters to persons or entities
who had leased automobiles from Globe.
Vol. 2 at 98-102)

(Tr Vol. 1 at 4 7-48;

The letters so sent informed the respec-

tive lessees of Globe that Globe had assigned the lessee's
lease to the Bank and, further, that the Bank was now requesting that any further rental payments be made directly
to the Bank instead of to Globe.

(Exhibit 9-P)

Also on

July 15, 1974, pursuant to the instructions of Mr. Norton
Parker, the then President of the Bank, the Bank determined
to terminate further extension of credit to Globe for its
automobile leases.

(Tr Vol. 1 at 49-50)

At or about this

same time, Mr. Parker was informed that there were in house,
or in process, three additional leases of Globe for which
funds by the Bank had not yet been advanced.

(Tr Vol. 1 at
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51-52; Vol. 2 at 106-108)

After a discussion with Mr. Al-

fred B. Weigelt, the principal owner and chief executive
officer of Globe, the only other employee being his wife
Gloria, Mr. Parker determined to honor the Bank's commitment
to extend financing for those last three leases.
at 54, 133-134; Vol. 2 at 106-108)

(Tr Vol. 1

After having instructed

bank employees to continue processing those three leases,
Mr. Parker discovered that, contrary to his past experience
or practice in such matters, the Bank had issued credit advices to the account of Globe in the amount of the sums advanced to Globe for the purchase of the automobiles which
were to be subject of the three leases.
132)

(Tr Vol. 2 at 129-

Because of a previous experience with one Naylor auto

in which it was apparent that the funds credited to Globe
for the purchase of an automobile subject to a lease being
financed by the Bank, had not been used to purchase that
automobile, Mr. Parker wishing to insure that that situation
would not again arise, ordered that the credit advices to
Globe's account be reversed.

(Tr Vol. 2 at 129-130)

Upon

receipt of notice of the said credit advices, Globe drew
checks for the purchase of the three automobiles subject to
the leases for which funds had been advanced by the Bank.
(Tr Vol. 1 at 52; Vol. 2 at 130-131)

The automobile dealers
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to whom those three checks were issued brought the checks in
person to the Bank to have them cashed.
129)

(Tr Vol. 1 at 128-

Because the credit advices had been reversed at the

direction of Mr. Parker, the said automobile dealers were
informed that the checks would not be honored by the Bank.
Mr. Parker attempted to arrange for an alternate method of
advancing the funds on the final three leases.

He caused

three cashier's checks to be issued in the name of Globe
and the respective dealer from whom the automobile would be
purchased.

Globe was then notified that those checks were

available at the Bank and could be picked up for use in payment for the three automobiles.

Globe refused to receive

the funds advanced to it by the Bank in that form and subsequently, through negotiations between the two parties, a
method of payment was agreed upon and checks drawn by Globe
to the three dealers were honored.

(Tr Vol. 1 at 52-55,

132-134; Vol. 2 at 131)
On or about July 17, 1974 the Bank notified Globe
by telegram that it would no longer extend credit to Globe.
(Exhibit 30-D)
For an understanding of the context in which the
actions of the Bank on or about July 15, 16 and 17 of 1974,
took place, it is necessary to provide some history and
background of the relationship between the Bank and Globe
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1xior to that time.

The relationship had its beginning some-

time in July of 1973 barely a year before the events which
gave rise to this lawsuit.

Mr. Weigelt, seeking financing

for a proposed automobile leasing company which would later
become Globe, came to the Bank at that time in 1973 to make
a presentation.

(Tr Vol. 1 at 3-5)

It appears that Mr.

Weigelt's contact with the Bank was principally through
Mr. James W. Perry, at that time employed by the Bank as a
Vice President in the consumer loan area.
11; Vol. 2 at 15-16)

(Tr Vol. 1 at 3-

The record as to the sequence of events

at that time is less than clear, however, it appears that
Mr. Weigelt also had the opportunity to make a presentation
of some kind to other officers of the Bank.
8-9)

(Tr Vol. 1 at

In any event, the result of Mr. Weigelt's solicitations

was that his proposal was presented to the loan committee of
the Bank which determined to turn down his application for
financing.

(Tr Vol.

2 at 15-16)

Shortly after the meeting of the loan committee at
which Globe's application for financing was denied, Mr.
Parker spoke with Mr. Perry concerning the Globe proposal.
ht that time, Mr. Parker instructed Mr. Perry to "try a few"
of the Globe leases.

(Tr Vol. 2 at 16-17)

It also appears,

that Mr. Parker told Mr. Perry that he should try a few
lea~e~ up to a

limit of about $30,000 or $40,000.

(Tr Vol.
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2 at 43-44)

Pursuant to that discussion, Mr. Perry sent a

letter to Mr. Weigelt purporting to confirm an agreement
entered into between Globe and the Bank.

In that letter,

Mr. Perry informed Mr. Weigelt that:
This agreement covers the assignment of lease
contracts to this bank from time to time as
generated through your normal business activities, and will remain in force until written
notice is received by either party to effect
the termination.
(Exhibit 8-P)

That letter from Mr. Perry apparently began

a series of transactions between Globe and the Bank on some
64 motor vehicle leases generated by Globe.

(Exhibit 17-P)

The apparent procedure used in effecting those
transactions was as follows:

Globe as an automobile leasing

company would locate prospective lessees.

Globe would make

its own credit check of the prospective lessee and provide
the Bank with credit information necessary for the Bank to
complete its own independent credit check of the prospective
lessee.

After approval by the Bank, both of the credit of

the prospective lessee and the amount to be advanced by the
Bank on the lease, Globe would apparently complete the
lease transaction by ordering the car subject of the lease,
execute the lease, execute a motor vehicle security agreement with the Bank as secured party, and execute an assignment
of the lease.

The lease, lease assignment and security

agreement would then be forwarded to the Bank at which time
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a credit advice in the amount to be advanced on the lease
would be issued by the Bank to the account of Globe.
hibit 17-P)

(Ex-

The Bank apparently set up the accounting for

the transactions with Globe on a main computer account with
Globe as the "dealer" and with each of the individual leases
which had been assigned to the Bank on a separate sub-account.

(Tr Vol.

1 at 11-26; Vol. 2 at 19-42)

Each month,

the Bank would debit Globe's operating account with the Bank
for the sums owing on each of the lease accounts.
There were some exceptions to the above mode of
effectuating the lease and lease assignment transaction between Globe and the Bank.

Although originally the amount of

the funds which Globe requested that the Bank advance on
each lease was in the amount of the purchase price of the
automobile subject to the lease, Globe changed that practice
and began requesting the amount of the purchase price of the
automobile plus 10% additional.
Vol 2. at 57, 123)

(Tr Vol. 1 at 12-13, 41-42;

In one specific instance, Globe received

as the proceeds of the loan on a lease to Donald L. Hildreth
the sum of $8, 546. 41.

The lease which was assigned by

Globe to the Bank in exchange for the advance of the funds
was not in fact a valid lease as the signature of Mr.
HildLeth had been forged thereon.
8~-10~.

146-156)

(Tr Vol. 1 at 42-47, 66,

There had been, in fact, a lease of an
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automobile to Mr. Hildreth by Globe.

However, the lease of

said automobile to Mr. Hildreth was not upon the same terms
as those represented in the lease with the forged signature
which was assigned to the Bank by Globe.
(Tr Vol. l at 92).

(Exhibit 26-D)

The actual lease between Globe and Mr.

Hildreth provided for a prepayment of the rentals on that
lease in the sum of $3,500.00.

(Tr Vol. l at 92-94)

Each

assignment of lease executed by Globe to the Bank contained
a provision prohibiting such prepayment without the written
consent and authorization of the Bank.

(Exhibit 20-P)

Neither the prepayments nor any sums received in payment
for the purchase of the automobile were paid to the Bank
at the time of their receipt by Globe.

Rather, Globe al-

lowed the Bank to continue to debit its account in accordance with the lease payment terms of the lease which had
been given to the Bank.

(Tr Vol. l at 100)

Another instance of departure from the procedure
above described, was an instance in which Globe received
funds from the Bank for the purchase of a 1974 Pontiac subject to a lease which was to be assigned to the Bank.

Con-

trary to the terms of the Motor Vehicle Security Agreement
given to the Bank in conjunction with the lease assignment of that Pontiac, Globe had, in fact, previously received a loan for the purchase of that same automobile from
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valley Bank & Trust Company and had granted to Valley Bank &
Trust Company a security interest in the same vehicle.

Upon

discovery of this instance of double financing, and in order
to

m~ke

good its security interest in the automobile, the

Bank paid to Valley Bank & Trust Company the sum of $3,165.95.
(Tr Vol. 1 at 111-115; Vol. 2 at 158-160)
In a further departure from the established procedure which departure was a major factor in the actions taken
by the Bank at the direction of Mr. Parker on July 15, 1974,
Globe obtained the approval of Mr. Perry on one lease to a
company called Leisureamerica.

However, fourteen other

leases to that same company were processed by the Bank apparently without the knowledge or approval of Mr. Perry.
(Tr Vol. 1 at 116-118; Vol. 2 at 66-75, 110)

Leisureamerica

Company was, in fact, a very bad credit risk.

Just prior to

July 15, 1974, Mr. Perry was on vacation.

During the period

of Mr. Perry's absence, Mr. Parker had occasion to make inquiry concerning the relationship of the Bank with Globe.
(Tr Vol. 2 at 96-98)

He discovered that instead of a total

sum of $30,000 to $40,000 in leases, the Bank had advanced
in excess of $390,000 on Globe leases and Mr. Parker thereupon began an irrunediate investigation of the files relatinq to Globe.
d1

In the process of such investigation, he

,crprJ the leases to Leisureamerica.

(Tr Vol. 2 at
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96-98)
Globe began operations sometime in July of 1973.
At that time, because of the letter from Mr. Perry to Mr.
Weigelt, Globe, a previously non-existent entity began operation as a Utah corporation.

Previous to the time of the

Bank's indication that it was willing to advance funds for
the leasing operation contemplated by Mr. Weigelt, Globe had
been unable to begin operation as a result of Mr. Weigelt's
inability to obtain financing from any other banking institu ti on.

(Tr Vol. 1 at 122-123)

This failure was not with-

standing the considerable efforts of Mr. Weigelt in making
presentations at a number of other institutions in the cornmunity.

Globe was capitalized for only about $3,000.00.

(Tr Vol. 1 at 120, 219)

On that capitalization, Globe pro-

ceeded to generate over $390,000 in outstanding leases.
Vol. 1 at 219)

(Tr

Then, one year after the initiation of the

relationship between the Bank and Globe (Tr Vol. 1 at 219),
the latter failed to obtain alternate financing and closed
its business with the exception of operating as a broker for
some six leases later in 1974.

(Tr Vol. 1 at 216-218)

ARGUMENT
I.

THE FINDINGS OF FACT MADE BY THE TRIAL COURT
DO NOT SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION OF LAW THAT
APPELLANT IS LIABLE FOR TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
WITH THE BUSINESS RELATIONS OF THE APPELLEE.
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In Mason v. Mason, 108 Utah 428, 160 P.2d 730
(1945) the court held, citing earlier Utah cases:
"It is fundamental that the conclusions
of law must be predicated upon and find
their support in the findings of fact, and
the judgment must follow the conclusions of
law" and if the conclusions are at variance
with the findings, the Supreme Court will
order the lower court to set aside its erroneous conclusions and substitute correct
ones therefor . • . . A judgment in conformity with the findings will not be disturbed.
And, of course, the converse is true. A
judgment not in conformity with the findings cannot be permitted to stand.
(Emphasis added.)
Id. at 732.

That fundamental proposition has applicability

in the review of the findings of fact and conclusions of
law, which resulted in a judgment of liability against Appellant, Commercial Security Bank of Salt Lake ("Bank") in
this case.
In paragraph 1 of the Conclusions of Law, the
court states:
The acts of defendant Bank of Salt
Lake outlined in the First, Second, Third,
and Fifth Causes of Action constitute a
tortious interference by the Bank of Salt
Lake in the business activities of Globe
Leasing, and all four causes are deemed
merged.
(Emphasis added.)
The findings of fact entered by the court do not support the
conclusion that there was "tortious interference" by the
Bank.

The substance of the relevant findings made by the
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court is that:
1.

The Bank extended credit to the Appellee,

Globe Leasing ("Globe"), to finance leases generated by
Globe;
2.

The credit was extended pursuant to an agree-

ment evidence:lby a letter signed by an officer of the Bank,
James W. Perry;
3.

Certain security devices were employed to

secure credit extended, such devices including an assignment
of each and every lease generated with funds advanced by
the Bank;
4.

On or about July 15, 1974, the Bank "commenced

dishonoring" Globe's checks, terminated the line of credit
(notification of the same was given by telegram July 17,
1974), directed letters to all of Globe Leasing's lessees requesting that payment be made to the Bank on the leases, and
impounded funds in Globe's accounts at the Bank;!/
5.

The above actions caused damage to Globe.

The holding of the trial court was simply that because the Bank had dishonored checks (for whatever reason,
justified or not), sent letters to lessees directing that
lease payments be made to the Bank instead of to Globe
1/ There is no allegation in the First, Second, Third, and
Fifth Causes of Action concerning the impoundment of funds by
the Bank.
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(whether or not a right to do so existed in the assignment
agreement and under the applicable provisions of Utah law) and
terminated further financing

(whether or not a right to so

terminate was included in the financing agreement), the Bank
tortiously interfered in the business relations of Globe.
Under no theory of tortious interference would the general
factual finding of the above actions by a defendant be sufficient to establish a finding of tortious interference with
business relations.
One of the theories advanced by Globe as a basis
for the liability of the Bank is that of slander of credit
or libel of business.

One prominent commentator has charac-

terized this theory of tortious interference as "injurious
falsehood" or "disparagement".'!:./

In sununarizing the elements

of tortious interference, that same authority states:
The cause of action .
. resembles
that for defamation, but differs from it materiall in the greater burden of proof resting on t e p ainti
an t e necessity or
special damage in all cases. The falsehood
must be communicated to a third person, since
the tort consists of interference with t~
relation with such persons.
But the plaintiff
must plead and prove not only the publication
and its disparaging innuendo, as in defamation, but something more. There is no presumption, as in the case of slander, that the
disparaging statement is false, and the

I~~.--C:--Pr05Ser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, §128 at 919
'4th r_>J.

1971).
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2laintiff must establish its falsity as a
part of his cause of action.
(Emphasis
added.)
W. L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, §128 at 920
(4th ed. 1971).

Utah law comports with this general state-

ment of the elements of the cause of action.

Accord,

v. Dowse, 1 Utah 2d 283, 291, 265, P.2d 644

(1954) and

~

Western States Title Insurance Co. v. Warnock, 18 Utah 2d 70,
415 P.2d 316, 318 (1966).

The court made no finding of fact

that any statement or publication or action constituting a
statement or publication of the Bank was disparaging or was
false as applied to Globe.
Another form of tortious interference which is
generally recognized is that of interference with contractual
relations.

Obviously, an element of that cause of action is

interference with some existing contractual relationship of
the plaintiff.

Specifically, the action is for inducing a

party to breach a contract with the plaintiff.

There was no

evidence and no finding of fact by the trial court that any
party with whom Globe had an existing contractual relationship was induced to breach such a contract.

The fact, if the

court had so found, that lessees made lease payments, pursuant to notice, directly to the Bank rather than to Globe
is no showing of a breach of contract with Globe on the part
of the lessees.
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Further, the law concerning liability for inducing
a breach of contract includes the opportunity for a defendant
tn plead and prove an absolute privilege for taking the action complained of by the plaintiff.

See Bunnell v. Bills,

13 Utah 2d 83, 90, 368 P.2d 597, 602-03 (1962) and Ganunon v.
Federated Milk Producers Ass'n., 11 Utah 2d 421, 426, 360 P.2d
1018, 1022

(1961).

The record contains ample evidence of the

existence of such a privilege for the Bank pursuant to the
terms of the assignment agreements.

The undisputed facts and

law relating to such rights will be discussed more completely
hereinafter.

Notwithstanding, the factual findings of the

trial court are absolutely devoid of any statement that the
Bank was not privileged to take the actions which it did.
The conclusion that liability exists for tortious interference
on the basis of those actions is, therefore, faulty and must
be reversed with directions to enter a conclusion of law to
the contrary.
Globe may, however, argue that there is implied in
the findings of fact, as presently constituted, a finding
that no absolute privilege existed.

Because evidence on

the issue of privilege was presented at trial, a finding of
liability by the trial court impliedly negates the existence,
in fact, of any such privilege.

However, the established
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law in our state has been announced as follows:
We are at a loss to understand why no
findings of fact were made in the instant
case.
The right to resort to the courts
for the adjudication of grievances and the
settlement of disputes is a fundamental and
important one! An indispensable requisite
to fulfilling that responsibility is the
determination of questions of fact uton
which there is disagreement.
It i s o r this
reason that our rules impose the duty of
making findings on all material issues.
Rule 52 U.R.C.P. provides that:
"In all
actions tried upon the facts without a jury
*** the court shall unless the same are
waived, find the facts specially and state
separately the conclusions of law thereon."
In Baker v. Hatch, the court declared:

*** It is the duty of the trial court to
find upon all issues raised by the pleadings, and the failure to do so is reversible
error.
{Citing authorities] (Emphasis
added.)
Legrand Johnson Corporation v. Peterson, 18 Utah 2d 260, 420
P.2d 615, 616

(1966).

The trial court has not "found the

facts specially" upon the issue of privilege.

There is,

therefore, reversible error in this case.
The rationale announced in Peterson, supra, for
making findings on all disputed issues is sound policy.
Without specific findings upon disputed issues, the parties
and others who rely upon the judgment of the court to guide
their later actions are left to speculate upon the nature
of the applicable law.
Likewise, if the judgment in this case is allowed

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-16-

to stand, it will appear that the court has ruled that the
Bank is strictly liable for the demise of any business whose
financing, pursuant to agreement, it terminates especially
where it exercises its rights in agreements and relationships
connected thereto.

That certainly cannot be and is not the

law and the Bank and others should not be required to act in
accordance therewith now or in the future.
Finally, some additional conunents must be addressed
to the most amorphous form of the cause of action for tortious interference, "interference with prospective advantage."
As with the cause of action for inducing a breach of contract, the actions which interfere must not be privileged
actions.
No case has been found in which intended but purely incidental interference
resulting from the pursuit of the defendant's own ends by proper means has been
held actionable.
W. L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, §130 at 952
(4th ed. 1971).

As has already been discussed, the court

made no finding of fact that the actions of the Bank were
not pursuant to legal rights, contractual, statutory, or
otherwise, and, therefore, not privileged.

In the face of

ample evidence of the existence of such rights and privilege, the statement of liability in paragraph 1 of the Conclnsion.s of Law must be reversed.
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II.
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION
OF LAW THAT APPELLANT TORTIOUSLY INTERFERED
WITH THE BUSINESS RELATIONS OF THE APPELLEE.
A careful examination of the trial court record reveals the reason why that court failed to make the specific
findings of material fact issues necessary to the conclusion of law that the Bank is liable for tortious interference, i.e., no such findings could be made on the evidence
presented in the record because there was no substantial
evidence to support such findings.
A.

THERE IS NO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF THE FALSITY OF ANY
INNUENDO TO BE DRAWN FROM THE ACTIONS OF APPELLANT.
There was no substantial evidence that any dis-

paraging innuendo which might have been drawn from the actions of the Bank was,

in fact, false.

in the record is to the contrary.

All of the evidence

The only "scintilla" of

evidence which was introduced by Globe which would tend to
show its creditworthiness was testimony by various witnesses
that the Bank's computer runs showed no payment delinquencies from Globe to the Bank.

That evidence is without any

substantiality in light of undisputed evidence that Globe's
currency on its loan accounts with the Bank for the brief
period of its operation, are explained by the fact that
Globe used a prepayment on one lease and security deposits,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-18-

tor which later refund or other use would be required, to
pay its current liabilities.

In other words, the evidence

was that Globe may only have been staying current by using
funds obtained in the present which were already subject to
future commitment or which were actually held on behalf of
lessees.

This, added to the undisputed evidence of double-

financing

(Tr Vol. 1 at 111-115), the issuance of a forged

lease to obtain loaned funds (Tr Vol. 1 at 42-47, 66, 89-104,
146-156), and the thin capitalization of the corporation
(Tr Vol. 1 at 120, 219), establish without any contrary evidence, that any innuendo of lack of creditworthiness was
founded in truth and could not possibly constitute a libel
or slander of Globe's credit or business.
B,

THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT APPELLANT WAS WITHOUT THE
ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE TO ACT AS IT DID IN EVERY INSTANCE.
There is no evidence in the record to support a

finding that the actions taken by the Bank were wrongful or
contrary to contractual and statutory rights.
the legal right to take each action.

The Bank had

The Bank's termina-

tion of any further financing to Globe was pursuant to the
undisputed contractual right to do so.

(Exhibit 8-P)

That

the exercise of the right of termination pursuant to the
terms of a contract may be taken, is a clearly established
proposition of law.

See, Flinco, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire and
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Rubber Company, 17 Utah 2d 173, 406 P.2d 911 (1965).

The

Bank gave oral notice of termination of further credit advances.

Thereafter, proper written notification of termina-

tion was given by telegram.

(Exhibit 30-D)

Secondly, the terms of the assignment of lease
which was used in every instance, places no condition upon
the right of the assignee, Bank, to give notice to the lessees to make payment directly to the Bank.
each assignment is unequivocal

The language of

(Exhibit 20-P):

For like consideration and said Bank of
Salt Lake is authorized and empowered to
collect all sums of money presently due-or
that at any time hereafter may become due and
owing as rental under the provisions of said
lease and to receipt thereof, as fully and
completely and for all purposes as the undersigned [Globe] might, or could, have done
had this assignment not been made and given.
(Emphasis added.)
Globe has argued that because, as the further language indicates, the assignment of rentals is made "as and for collateral security," that any direct rental collection by the
Bank was conditioned upon the occurrence of a default in
payment of sums owing the Bank.

There is no evidence to

support that restrictive construction of the agreement and
even the trial court found differently, albeit, as will be
shown below, not in accord with the law.

The trial court

found in paragraph 4 of its findings of fact that the Bank's
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right to collect rentals was simply conditioned upon "default" by Globe.
There is no evidence to support the imposition of
any condition on the Bank's rights to collect rentals.

Not-

withstanding an assignment of lease payments for "collateral,"
direct collection by the secured party can be made without
any condition of default.

In §70A-9-502(1) of the Utah

code Annotated it is provided that:
When so agreed and in any event on default the secured party is entitled to notify
an account debtor or the obligor on an instrument to make payment to him whether or
not the assignor was theretofore making collection on the collateral . . . .
(Emphasis added.)
Where there is ambiguity in the terms of a written
agreement, the well-established rule of law is that "in case
of doubt or ambiguity a contract will be construed most
strongly against the party who drew or prepared it
See 17

Am

Jur 2d §276 at 690; Accord, Bryant v. Deseret

News Publishing Co., 233 P.2d 355, 356 (1951).

Accordingly,

whatever ambiguity exists in the lease assignments as to the
existence and content of any condition precedent to direct
collection of rental payments by the Bank must be construed
in favor of the Bank since the undisputed evidence is that
the assignment agreement was a document drafted by and pro'vided b/ Gluue.

Accordingly, in light of the unequivocal
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language of the assignments, quoted above, giving the Bank
authorization and power for collection and receipt of rentals,
the conclusion of the trial court that a condition precedent
to collection existed is contrary to law and the facts.

The

construction most favorable to the Bank, justified by the assignment agreement on its face, is that part of the collateral security afforded under the agreement to the Bank is the
unconditional right at any time to collect payments directly
from the lessees.
Even if there were some condition precedent to the
Bank's collection rignt, a fair and reasonable construction
of the condition would necessarily be broader than default
in "payments" to the Bank by Globe.

The court found the

condition to be "plaintiff's default."
language of the Motor VehiclE

As evidenced by the

Security Agreements executed

in conjunction with the leases assigned to the Bank, "default"
is a broad term which can include the secured party "deeming
itself to be insecure for any reason whatsoever."
fically,

Speci-

§?OA-1-208, of Utah Code Annotated, provides as

follows:
A term providing that one party or his successor in interest may accelerate payment
or performance or require collateral or
additional collateral "at will" or "when he
deems himself insecure" or words of similar
import shall be construed to mean that he
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shall have power to do so only if he in good
faith believes that the prospect of payment
or performance is impaired. The burden of
establishing lack of good faith is upon the
party against whom the power has been exercised. (Emphasis added.)
The undisputed evidence is that Mr. Norton Parker,
the Bank's president, took action to notify lessees to make
payments to the Bank for several reasons including the existence of leases to Leisureamerica, an entity of doubtful
creditworthiness.

(Tr Vol. 2 at 97, 125-126)

The existence

of fifteen or so bad leases appearing to have no proper
Bank authorization would constitute an event of default and
certainly justify a good faith belief that the prospects of
payment or performance were impaired.

In any event, there

was an absolute absence of any evidence by Globe tending to
show any "lack of good faith" by the Bank in its belief of
some insecurity with respect to Globe.

In fact, the evi-

dence was that Mr. Parker believed that Globe had been
making payoffs to someone at the Bank in exchange for the
credit advances.

(Tr Vol. 1 at 50)

All of the evidence

before the court justified such a belief since the thirty
to forty thousand dollar cap which he had given Mr. Perry
was exceeded almost twelve-fold and since a number of
doubtful leases to Leisurearnerica appeared to have been
processed without appropriate approval.

(Tr Vol. 2 at 126)
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Because there was a "default," the notices sent by the Bank
to the lessees were in strict compliance with its rights
under the assignment agreement and pursuant to collection
rights afforded under §70A-9-502(1), Utah Code Annotated.
No liability for tortious interference can arise from notices given in accordance with contractual and statutory
rights.

In a case directly on point, this court so held.
{A] creditor who has a security interest in
personal property has a right to notify any
third party of his interest; and doing so
does not constitute an actionable interference
with the debtor's business.

First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Wright, 521 P.2d 563,
567

(1974).

In that case, defendant Wright had assigned

certain proceeds from crops to First Security to secure a
loan.

Certain of those crops had been sold to Mountain

View Dairy and Moroni Feed.

Before payment could be made

First Security notified Mountain View and Moroni of its
security interest and demanded payment.

On Wright's counter-

claim on the basis of such notice, the Court held the notice was proper and appropriate.
Thirdly, there is no evidence to support any conclusion that the Bank was not within the exercise of its
lawful rights to refuse payment on Globe's three checks.
There has been no evidence that funds were in the account
at the time the checks were presented for payment.
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In fact,

tlie

e:idence is that credits given for the final three leases

negotiated with the Bank were reversed in order to utilize
a different fund advancement procedure.
and 130)

(Tr Vol. 2 at 107

Further, there is no evidence nor any legal reason

in tne record to preclude the Bank from adopting an alternate
mode for advancing funds to Globe on approved leases and acting in accord with its determination to adopt that alternative.
Mr. Weigelt testified that he discussed alternative methods
for advancing funds to Globe in one of his original meetings
with Bank officers.
C.

(Tr Vol. l at 10)

THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A FINDING BY THE TRIAL
COURT THAT ANY INJURY TO THE APPELLEE, IF ANY, WAS THE
PROXIMATE RESULT OF THE ACTIONS OF THE APPELLANT.
Even assuming that the actions of the Bank in ter-

minating Globe's credit, sending notices to lessees, and refusing payment on three checks drawn by Globe somehow satisfy one of the elements of the alleged tort of interfering
with business relationships, there is absolutely no evidence
to show that such actions "caused" any interference with
Globe's business relations, past, present, future, contractual, or otherwise.

It is fundamental that there must

be a 0howing of interference with some business relationship
caused by Bank's actions before liability can be found.

To

prope:cly evaluate Globe's claim of tortious interference,
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it is helpful to delineate the parties with whom Globe
either had or anticipated having business relationships.
Such parties would be fully included in the following listing:
1.

Financial institutions, including banks;

2.

Current and prospective lessees;

3.

Automobile dealers from whom car purchases

were and would be made.
Taking these groups in reverse order, consider
first "automobile dealers."

There is absolutely no evidence

that Globe's ability to purchase automobiles from relevant
dealers was in any way diminished.

Notwithstanding the dis-

honor of checks drawn to the order of three particular
dealers, there is no evidence that they refused to do further business with Globe.

In fact, the evidence shows

that the three purchases were ultimately consummated on
checks drawn by Globe.

Further, the evidence is that Globe's

credit reputation with such dealers was not very good in
event.

(Tr Vol. 1 at 128-129)

a~

The three dealers took the

checks from Globe directly to the Bank to be cashed.

As

Mr. Weigelt testified, that was highly unusual and indicated
some doubt, prior to knowledge of the actions of the Bank,
about the creditworthiness of Globe.
Second, as to current and prospective lessees, it
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:,as alieady been pointed out there is no evidence that any
lessee lll:cached a contract with Globe as a result of the
Bank's actions.

There is also a lack of substantial evi-

dence to support any conclusion that the Bank's notice
caused either current lessees or prospective lessees to refrain from doing further business with Globe.

There is,

however, evidence in letters (Exhibit 22-P) that certain of
the lessees were confused about the payment notices sent by
the Bank and threatened to cease ref erring others to Globe
or to do future business with Globe.

As is clearly evi-

denced by those letters, however, that confusion and any
negative impact which the notice of assignment had upon the
lessees' regard for Globe were the result of either their
failure to understand the clear language of their lease
agreements or some representation by Globe's Mr. Weigelt
that, notwithstanding such language, he would not assign the
's

leases.

Paragraph 13 of each lease explicitly grants to

Globe the right to assign without notice.

(Exhibit 17-P)

Fault, therefore, cannot be placed with the Bank.

There is

no showing that lessees ceased doing business with Globe nor
is there any showing of actual damages as a result of the
notices.
Finally, with respect to other financial institutions, there is no evidence to indicate that any action of
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the Bank, taken singly or in the aggregate, interfered with
Globe's relationship, present or prospective, with such institutions.

The only existing relationship, outside of thdt

with Appellant Bank, was with Valley Bank & Trust Co.

There

is no evidence showing that Valley Bank refused financing or
further dealings with Globe because of the acts of the Appellant Bank.

Mr. Weigelt testified that he "thought" that

he had spoken with Mr. Benson at Valley subsequent to the
events which precipitated this lawsuit.

(Tr Vol. 1 at 72)

Mr. Benson's unequivocal testimony, however, was that no con·
tact for lease financing was made with Valley after
197 4.

(Tr Vol.

"ear~"

2 at 162)

The evidence, with nothing to the contrary, is
also that no bank except Appellant would finance Globe
prior to the July, 1974 events.

The uncontroverted evidence

is also that no bank including Appellant would finance
Globe's operations after the events of July, 1974.

To show

that the Appellant Bank interfered with any prospective advantage with these other banks, there must be some evidence
that something of significance after Globe's initial approach had occurred which would have made the initial refusals of those banks turn into acceptances of the financi~
package.

In other words, there must be substantial evidence

in the record to show that but for the Bank's actions in
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iuly -ii -;_974,

ing.

other banks would have agreed to assume financ-

There simply is no such evidence.
The testimony of Mr. Frank Stuart, an alleged ex-

pert witness on leasing and damages, was to the effect that
tts~e

was no way that Globe could have continued in business

after July, 1974 because the crucial consideration was •cash
flow" which was absent because of the Bank's actions.
Vol. 1 at 209)

(Tr

That evidence is without any substantial

value since Mr. Stuart also testified that in the absence of
any cash flow he would have as a banking expert rec•

nded

credit extension because of Globe's •track record.•;!/ (Tr
Vol. l at 220)

The evidence, then, is that the absence of

cash flow, though a consideration in determining creditworthiness would not, in the opinion of a banking expert,
have caused the inability of Globe to obtain credit.
Mr. Stuart's testimony was to that effect because Globe's track record was a strong •plus.•
l at 235-241)

(Tr Vol.

In other words, if be bad been a banker in

the period of time immediately following the events of
July, 1974, he would have extended credit to Globe.

lllo

bank did, in fact, extend credit to Globe at that ti.lie and

Y

In substance, Mr. Stuart testified that his negative
assessment of Globe as a marginal operation was chanqed because of t:be proven ability to generate leases •which appeared 'n r-he surface to be good.•
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under those circumstances.

Globe would draw from the

juxtaposition of that fact and Mr. Stuart's opinion that
some other factor, hopefully attributable to some wrongful
act or acts of the Bank caused the unfavorable results on
the applications for credit which Globe made at that time.
The only other unfavorable factor attributable to
the Bank's actions which could account for the denial of
credit would be some disparagement of Globe's credit.

As

has already been emphasized in this breif, the court made

00

finding that such disparagement occurred (i.e., no false
statements about Globe's creditworthiness) and could not
make such a finding because all evidence was to the contrary (i.e., that Globe was not creditworthy).

Even if

any innuendo concerning Globe's credit arose from the Bank's
conduct, there is no substantial evidence that banks refused credit to Globe for that reason.

Mr. Weigelt testi-

fied that he only encountered common knowledge of the "Bank
of Salt Lake matter" at two of the seven or eight banks at
which he made credit application.

(Tr Vol. 1 at 72-73)

There is no evidence by Mr. Weigelt or any other witness
as to whether or not the "Bank of Salt Lake matter" was t~
reason that those two banks or any bank refused an extension
of credit.

Other evidence in the record is to the contracy.

When Mr. Stuart was questioned as a banking expert as to
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what neqative effect on Globe's credit, instances of double
fina11cing, assignment of a forged lease, and leases to
Leisureamerica would have, he indicated that the track
record of Globe would justify continued financing.
1 at 235-241)

(Tr Vol.

That evidence would suggest that some factor

not attributable to the Bank's acts was the reason for the
denial of Globe's credit applications after July of 1974.
As the testimony of Larry Benson indicates, the reason
for such denials may have been, as it was in the case of
Valley Bank, because the banks were simply not interested
in financing that kind of operation.

(Tr Vol. 2 at 170)

In fact Valley Bank's denial of credit in "early" 1974 to
Globe notwithstanding its "track record" and no problems
with Bank, suggests strongly that the banking community
was simply not interested.
III.

THE AWARD OF DAMAGES BASED ON LOST PROFITS WAS
ERRONEOUS AS CONTRARY TO THE LAW AS APPLIED TO
THIS CASE.
"The basic and general rule is that
loss of anticipated profits of a business
venture involve so many factors of uncertainty that ordinarily profits to be
realized in the future are too speculative
to base an award of damages thereon."
Howarth v. Ostergaard, 30 Utah 2d 183, 187, 515 P.2d 442
(1973).

Conversely, the court said:
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The other side of the coin is that damages
to a business or enterprise need only be
proved with sufficient certainty that
reasonable minds might believe from a preponderance of the evidence that the damages
were actually suffered.
Id. at 187.

Under this general rule, an award of damages

measured by lost profits was erroneous because highly
speculative and conjectural.
As has already been argued, the "finding of fact"
by the trial court that the actions of the Bank caused
damage to Globe is insufficient because it does not adequately address issues of fact presented at trial as to how
the Bank's actions became the cause of those damages.

The

ambiguity and inadequacy of the finding is magnified by an
attempt to specify whether the damages measured by lost
profits were sustained by reason of a termination of the
business allegedly caused by the Bank or a diminution of
the business of Globe, the actual termination being the
consequence of factors independent of the alleged wrongdoing of the Bank.
If the trial court awarded damages measured by
lost profits for a diminution of the business of Globe
caused by the wrongdoing of the Bank, the award must be reversed for an absolute absence of any evidence or findings
of fact to support such a conclusion.

There was no evi-
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dence at trial indicating the extent of any such diminution
and an award of lost profits so based would be totally arbitrary and based upon the speculation of the trial judge.
Under a second theory, as argued by counsel for
Globe, the award of damages measured by lost profits is
based upon the conclusion that the Bank's actions caused a
wrongful termination of the business of Globe.

We speculate

that the trial court based its award upon that theory.

Under

that theory evidence was submitted to the court via the expert testimony of Mr. Stuart to establish the amount of such
lost profits.

Under the general rule expressed by the Utah

Supreme Court in Howarth, supra, no award of damages should
have been made for a number of reasons.
A.

NO AWARD UNDER NEW BUSINESS RULE
In the first place, the evidence before the court

shows Globe to be a new business having actually operated
for only one year.

The general rule for awarding damages

in the form of lost profits is given an added dimension of
restrictiveness and caution when applied to new businesses.
This Court in an opinion which would be considered dicta!!
when applied to the facts of the case in which it was stated,

Y

That the ''new business" rule quoted by the court is wellestabl ishcd and accepted is amply evidenced by its reiteration in 22 Am Jur 2d §173 at 245; 25 Corp. Jur. Sec. §42 at
741; C. T. McCormick, Handbook on the Law of Damages, §29
at 197 (1931): 64 Harv. L. Rev. 317, 319 (1950).
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albeit stated in a manner suggesting a strong disposition to
adopt the broader principle enunciated, quoted from Carolen

-----..!

Sales Co. v. Canyon Milk Products Co., 122 Wash 220, 210 P.
366, 367

(1922) as follows:
[B]efore special damages for loss of
profits to a general business occasioned by
the wrongful acts of another may be recovered
it must be made to appear that the business '
had been in successful operation for such a
period of time as to give it permanency and
recognition, and that such business was earning a profit which could be reasonably ascertained and approximated.
(Emphasis added.)

Jenkins v. Morgan, 123 Utah 480, 260 P.2d 532, 535 (1953).
I

-2

C

Accord, Price v. Van Lint, 46 N.M. 58, -itz-o P.2d 611, 618
(1941).
The application of the Carolene Sales rule is but
another safeguard against the award of speculative damages.
The imposition of the requirements of "permanency" and
"recognition" is but a shorthand method of insuring that
many of the uncertainties and contingencies associated wiili
the successful operation of a business have been eliminated.
Applying the Carolene Sales criteria to Globe, il
is evident that not only should an award of future profits
have been denied, but any evidence concerning the same shoulc
have been excluded pursuant to the motion of the Bank's
counsel at trial.

With regard to the permanency of the

business of Globe, there is no substantial or credible evi·
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la

dence in the record to show permanency of the operation.
f\11 indicutions are to the contrary.

There is undisputed

evidence of bad credit practices which were not merely unsound in a business sense, but fraudulent.

The two speci-

f.Le i11stances of significance were the Hildreth leases, one
of which was forged, and the double financing of a lease
with Bank and Valley Bank.

There is no inference of perma-

nence to be drawn from those facts for a company which engages in such practices.
It might be argued that the large number of leases
generated by the company over a very short period of time
is evidence of permanence.

However, there is no credible

evidence in the record which would support the profitability
of those leases or continuation of those customers.

In

fact, the evidence as concerns a random sampling of leases
generated by Globe shows a net loss both due to faulty calculation of residuals and due to the lack of creditworthiness of the leases.

(Tr Vol. 2 at 173-178)

The testimony of

Mr. Stuart concerning those leases was not, with the exception
of the problem leases to Leisurearnerica, based upon his appraisal of the soundness of any of the particular lessees'
credit.

(Tr Vol. 1 at 212)

Mr. Stuart's testimony was that

he felt the leases were sound credit-wise because the Bank's
[Jrint,Jnt showed timely payment from Globe to the Bank.

(Tr
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Vol. 1 at 212-213)

However, the conclusion was based upon

the erroneous assumption that there were no lease prepayments
which would allow Globe's payments to the Bank to be current
(~

while some of the lessee's payments to Globe were not.
Vol. 1 at 223-224)

Mr. Stuart's calculations with respect

to those leases were premised upon his experience with leasinc
operations, large and successful, and operated as an adjunct
to automobile dealerships.

(Tr Vol. 1 at 159-161, 189)

There is nothing in the evidence, except Mr. Stuart's testimony of Globe's high rate of generating leases, to show any
analogy whatsoever between the leasing operations upon
which Mr. Stuart based his expertise and Globe's actual
operations.
Additionally, there is substantial evidence in
the record to show that there was little interest in the
banking community for an auto leasing enterprise like Globe's.
(Tr Vol. 1 at 122-123; Vol. 2 at 170)

Reliance on one

ba~

with a relatively low lending limit, both in terms of common business sense and legal requirements, does not suggest
permanency at all.
Finally, the fact that the termination of the one
line of credit established could result in the demise of
the business suggests both lack of permanency and recogni-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-36-

tion, notwithstanding any negative reflections upon Globe's
credit which may have resulted from the Bank's actions.

In-

deed, the negative reflections on credit occasioned by the
Bank's action should have been substantially discounted by
bar.kers according to Mr. Stuart.

As previously noted here-

in, he testified that double financing, a forged lease, and
a series of bad leases to one company would not really
bother him in the face of Globe's stellar performance,
supra.

He also, as earlier indicated, testified that track

record, as opposed to existence of present cash flow, is the
determinative factor in extending credit.

All this would

suggest that Mr. Stuart's assessment of the permanence and
recognition of Globe was overstated since no bank with the
same or greater expertise as Mr. Stuart advanced funds in
reliance thereon.
B.

NO AWARD BECAUSE ALL LOST PROFIT WAS SPECULATIVE ON
EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT.
Even if Globe managed to satisfy the Carolene

Sales test, lost profit damages would remain purely speculative.

In making his projections as to the profitability

of Globe's operation, Mr. Stuart used a figure for bad
debt based on "his experience with automobile leasing businesses" with which he had been associated.
188)

(Tr Vol. 1 at

His later testimony was that the bad debt expense in
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such companies and, therefore, also with his calculations
for Globe, were very low.

(Tr Vol. 1 at 194)

There is

nothing in the evidence to support a low bad debt allowance
for Globe.

Nothing in the evidence shows that Globe had,

or ever would, operate in the same manner as the four,
very well run, businesses upon which Mr. Stuart based his
bad debt allowance for Globe.
Based upon an estimate of bad debt reserve which
is "very low," because derived from operations which were
conducted by successful long-term leasing operations for
which there is no evidence of comparability with Globe nor
evidence that Globe did, could, or would "release" cars
subject to repossession, Mr. Stuart calculated a net cash
flow of $4, 800. 00. (Tr Vol. 1 at 189)

He then used that data

to calculate the lost profits to Globe.
216)

(Tr Vol. 1 at 214-

Without credible or reliable evidence as to what

should have been the bad debt reserve for Globe's operation,
any calculation of a loss of future profits is mere speculation.
A further reason for disallowing any award of
damages as to loss of profits relates closely to the question of permanency and recognition.

Mr. Stuart made his

calculation of lost profits on the basis of a ten-year
period of continued business.

Any estimation as to the
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duration of Globe's operation absent the alleged wrong-doing
of the Bank would be pure speculation and an award of
damages based thereon would be in error.

In Monter v.

Kratzer, 29 Utah 2d 18, 504 P.2d 40, 43 (1972), it was held
that:
[A] judgment cannot be based upon mere speculation.
Where the loss is pecuniary and is present
and can be measured but no sufficient evidence
is given as to duration, or from which the
duration, of time during which the damage will
continue can be inferred, the jury, or the
court sitting without a jury, can allow only
nominal damages.
(Emphasis added.)
The facts in Kratzer on the question of duration present a
striking similarity to the evidence in this case.

In Kratzer

the defendant counterclaimant was wrongfully evicted for one
day from his bakery by the plaintiff.

On that day Conti-

nental Baking Company was unable to obtain an order from
defendant.

Thereafter Continental did no further business

with the defendant although it had previously placed orders
with defendant for some 17 years.

The trial court awarded

damages to defendant on his counterclaim for profits lost
as a result of Continental's termination.

This Court re-

versed that award based upon the above principle of law.
The evidence at trial was that Continental's business with
defendant was

0n

the decline and that there was a likeli-
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hood of termination in the very near future notwithstanding
the wrong-doing of the plaintiff.
This case is similar.

The Bank may well have

terminated financing at any point which it had the right to
do.

It could accept or reject any lease.

Without another

source of financing, and there is no credible evidence that
any would have been available even absent any "wrong-doing"
by the Bank, Globe may have been out of business a few months
or a year later.

The holding of Kratzer requires that

nominal damages, if any, be awarded.

on~

In another case,

Gould v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 6 Utah
2d 187, 309 P.2d 802 (1957) this court applied a fairly
liberalized standard of certainty to a claim for lost profits
arising from a failure by the defendant to properly list
plaintiff in the telephone directory.

After concluding

that in those instances where it is clear that plaintiff
has damaged defendant, liability should not be escaped because of uncertainty in the amount of damages resulting,
this Court said:
The rule remains, however, proof of loss
of profits must not be completely speculative
nor uncertain as to fact, although permissible
as to measure or extent, and on the present
state of proof it appears that the award for
loss of prospective profits is wholly specu~
lative and cannot be allowed.
The prospective
profits were based on the speculative assumption that the potential clients lost through
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non-referral would have resulted in the
referral of other clients or business by
the clients presumably lost.

Id. at 194.

The parallel to this case is compelling.

Globe

has made absolutely no showing that it could have obtained
alternate financing;

and, certainly with the loan limit

questions and questionable practices involved, there is
nothing to show any reasonable expectancy of continued
financing from the Bank.

Gould also requires a denial of

any damages for lost profits.

C.

THE MOTION OF THE BANK TO STRIKE MR. STUART'S TESTIMONY
SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED AT LEAST IN PART AS UNSUPPORTED
BY EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT. THE FAILURE TO STRIKE
WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR AS TO AN AWARD OF DAMAGES BASED
UPON LOST PROFITS, BECAUSE IT RESULTED IN THE COURT'S
AWARD OF DAMAGES ON EVIDENCE NOT BEFORE IT.
Fundamental to the opinions and calculations of

Mr. Frank Stuart as to the future profits of Globe and its
"track record" as a basis for credit extension, was his assessment of the business as a whole, and of the unaudited
financial statements and other accounting records of Globe
in particular.

In his step by step calculation of prof its

for Globe, figures were taken directly from those accountlng recor~s anct statements.

(Tr Vol. 1 at 162-166)

His
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evaluation of the business as a whole and, therefore, his
high opinion of its quality were based in part upon those
same unaudited financial statements and records.

His

rather strong reluctance, while testifying in his role as
an alleged expert banker, to discontinue or limit lending
to Globe in the face of the fifteen bad credit risk
Leisureamer ica leases, the double financing, a forged lease,
and very thin capitalization, must have also been founded,
as any banker's opinion would be, upon those accounting
records and statements.

(Tr Vol. 1 at 234-241)

The court too had the opportunity to view those
same accounting records and to attempt to draw therefrom
findings of fact.

(Exhibits 3-P; 4-P; 5-P)

However, funda·

mental to the interpretation and understanding of those
accounting records were the preparing accountant's working papers.

Mr. Stuart testified that he relied on those

working papers to "assist in a total understanding of"
those records.

Yet, the working papers were not introduced

into evidence and the court, therefore, could not possib~
have checked Mr. Stuart's understanding of the accounting
records by referring to the working papers.

Not only were

Mr. Stuart's opinions, therefore not based totally upon
matters in evidence; the conclusions of the court, if ba~d
in any part upon those opinions, were also not based upon
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•

~vidence

pr0perly before the court and subject to cross-

exarnina tion.
In that regard, this Court has ruled unequivocably
that:
In deciding a case tried without the
aid of a jury, the court has great leeway
in deciding what are the facts as presented
by the evidence before him.
However,
neither a judge nor jury is permitted to
go outside the evidence to make a finding.
(Emphasis added.)
salt Lake City v. United Park City Mines Company, 29 Utah
2d 409, 412, 503 P.2d 850, 852 (1972).

In that case, the

trial judge had made computations on the basis of a book
which was never in evidence.

Id. at 852.

This case is not different.

Here, in awarding

damages, the trial judge concluded that the proper measure
was "lost profits."

(R. at 373-374)

The only evidence and

calculation as to the lost profits was presented by Mr.
Stuart whose evaluations were based in part upon the total
understanding of working papers not in evidence.

There is

no meaningful distinction to be drawn between reliance by
a judge directly upon matters not in evidence or indirectly
through the conclusions of an expert witness, to make damage calculations.
error.
s~lves,

Accordingly, the damage award was in

In the absence of either the working papers, them1 '.":

opinions and calculations of Mr. Stuart
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based thereon - such opinions and testimony were before the
court by reason of a denial of the Bank's motion to strike
the same - no credible evidence of Globe's profitability
was before the court and no calculation of lost profits,
except upon pure speculation, could have been made.
IV.

THERE ARE NO FINDINGS OF FACT TO SUPPORT THE
CONCLUSION OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT APPELLEE
SUFFERED DAMAGES MEASURED BY LOST PROFIT IN
THE SUM OF FIFTY THOUSAND DOLLARS ($50,000.00).
A dominant theme of this appeal is the inadequacy
of the findings of fact

(and lack of evidence therefor)

entered by the trial court in supposed support of the conclusions of law.

A highly contested issue of fact in this

case was the amount, if any, and measure of damages to be
awarded if liability was found against the Bank.

The issue

was a rather complex one based upon rather sophisticated
economic and business calculations and projections.

Yet,

the court in awarding damages in the amount of $50,000.00
"for lost profits" did not enter a finding of fact as to
what could reasonably have been the expected duration of
Globe's operation at a profit or the amount of the profit.
Nor did the court enter a fi~ding of fact on the well-debated issue of whether or not Globe's operation was, or
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.
.t~c,
c.cven ,,,uu _1<)

a pro f"it-ma k"ing venture. -5 /

Further, the

ficJure o:- $50, 000. 00 for lost profits bears not even the
slightest resemblance to any evidence presented to the
court on che issue and is merely a gross invention producecd by some unknown method of judicial legerdemain.
There was an absence of specific fact findings on
material issues which would support the figure advanced by
the court.

The holding in Legrand Johnson Corp.

v. Peter-

son, supra, was designed to avoid such results.

v.
THE DISMISSAL OF ALL COUNTERCLAIMS OF THE
APPELLANT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY FINDINGS OF
FACT MADE BY THE COURT OR BY EVIDENCE IN
THE RECORD AND SHOULD THEREFORE, BE REVERSED.
The undisputed evidence at trial was that Globe assigned to the Bank a lease with the forged signature of the
purported lessee, Donald Hildreth.

Said lease was assigned

to the Bank in consideration of a sum of $8,546.41 advanced
to Globe.

(Tr Vol. 1 at 89)

The uncontroverted evidence

was also that Globe had previously executed a valid lease
with said Donald Hildreth, which lease contained terms completely at variance with the forged lease which was assigned
to the Bank.

(Tr Vol. 1 at 90-104; Exhibit 29-D)

The ori-

21

In fact, the unaudited financials of Globe, without any
expert interpretation and reworking, show actual operating
losses for Globe for the first year.
(Tr Vol. 1 at 135 and
Exhibi t'i }- P, 4-P and 5-P)
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ginal and valid lease executed by said Donald Hildreth was
shown by the evidence to have been prepaid in full in ad~~

vance and that the Bank suffered damage as a result of

fraudulent action in the amount of Three Thousand One Hundred Eleven Dollars ($3,111.00).

(Tr Vol. 2 at 197)

The

uncontroverted evidence that was introduced at trial showed
the forged document to have been totally within the control
of Globe's only two officers, Mr. and Mrs. Weigelt.
There was also undisputed evidence at trial that,
contrary to express representations made in a security agree·
ment with the Bank and, upon which the Bank relied in advancing funds for the assignment of the motor vehicle lease
of a 1974 Pontiac, No. 0701-01-01, Mr. Weigelt, as President
of Globe, had obtained a loan previously from Valley Bank&
Trust Company and had given a security interest in that
same automobile.

(Tr Vol. 1 at 111)

The further uncontro-

verted evidence at trial was that the Bank was damaged in
the sum of Three Thousand One Hundred Sixty Five and 95/100
Dollars ($3,165.95)

incurred in making good the

represe~~

tion of Globe that no such prior security interest exist~.
(Tr Vol. 2 at 160)
Despite the presence of such uncontroverted evidence in the record, the trial court made no findings of
fact with respect to the above-described claims of the
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6/

Bank. -

.l\s

has already been argued the failure to make such

findings is reversible error.

See Legrand Johnson Corp. v.

Peterson, supra.
Furthermore, the court not only failed to make
spc::,ific findings of fact as to those two claims of the Bank,
it concluded, without any evidence in support thereof, that

the counterclaims of the Bank should be dismissed.

In para-

graph 12 of the findings of fact, the court found that
"factually the defendant Bank of Salt Lake's Counterclaim
should be dismissed."

In paragraph 5 of the Conclusions of

Law, the court states:
The Counterclaim of the Bank of Salt Lake
having been considered in determining Globe
Leasing's damages should be dismissed.
(R. at 371-374)

Both statements are totally inexplicable

either on the basis of the court's fact findings or, more
so, on the basis of the evidence at trial.
Neither Mr. or Mrs. Weigelt ever denied that the

~ The substance of the claim on the Hildreth lease was
pleaded in the counterclaim as filed with the court.
(R.
at 39) As for the claim of the Bank for double financing
of the 1974 Pontiac, in a stipulation between the Bank and
Mr. Weigelt, Globe's principal owner and officer, which
stipulation was entered in the bankruptcy proceedings of
Mr. Weigelt, it was agreed that this claim was one which
would be adjudicated in the trial proceedings in this case.
Although the record shows no formal amendment to include
this claim jn the original counterclaim, the proof of the
claim was introduced at trial without objection by Globe's
counsel
(P. at 350-351)
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second Hildreth lease was forged.

Mrs. Weigelt simply dis-

claimed knowledge of how the forgery came about.
1 at 269-270)

(Tr Vol,

The line of questioning employed by counsel

for Globe suggested that the explanation was that Mr. Hildreth authorized Mr. Weigelt to sign on his behalf.

The un-

contested testimony of Mr. Hildreth was that he had never
given such authorization.

(Tr Vol. 1 at 152)

Nor was there any denial of the fact of the
financing on the '74 Pontiac lease.
denial of responsibility therefor.

do~~

Indeed, there was no
Mr. Weigelt simply at-

tempted to explain the matter away as administrative oversight.

(Tr Vol. 1 at 112-114, 136-137)

the damage was done.

Oversight or fraud,

On either theory, the problem hardly

supports the opinion testimony offered by Mr. Stuart that
Globe was an efficient, well-run, successful business.
In the face of such clear evidence with

nothi~~

substance to the contrary, the dismissal of all of the Bank':
counterclaims must be reversed and judgment entered in the
sums claimed.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing arguments, the Appellant
Commercial Security Bank of Salt Lake is entitled to a
judgment by this Court reversing the judgment of liabili~
and award of damages made on behalf of the Appellee by the
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tn.al court.

Further, from the foregoing, Appellant is

entitled to a reversal of the trial court's dismissal of
its counterclaims, an entry of judgment on its behalf and

an award of the appropriate damages.
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